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Gangs and the Origins of a Culture of Violence
in El Salvador
Norma Roumie
University of Windsor

Abstract
Gang violence in El Salvador has resulted in conditions that
have perpetuated an environment of terror and culture of violence.
This paper aims to understand the emergence of transnational gangs
in El Salvador and the US involvement in this process. The article is
divided into the following subtitles; 1980s civil war and the
repercussions of US involvement, Salvadorans migration to the US
and reverse migration (with a focus on Los Angeles and San
Salvador), and US exportation of heavy-handed policies to El
Salvador’s institutionalized use of political violence. The paper
concludes that US involvement in El Salvador created a foundation
for a culture of violence and through interlinked factors US influence
and actions instigated circumstances for gang proliferated in El
Salvador.

Keywords: El Salvador, Latin America, Gangs, Migration, Culture of
Violence, Northern Triangle, US Politics
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T

he Central American University’s Institute of Public Opinion

(IUODOP) conducted two studies in 1998 and 2003, in which
Salvadoran participants were presented with scenarios and questioned
on whether the scenarios justified or condoned a violent response.
The survey results revealed extremely high levels of reception
towards violence and aggressive attitudes among the Salvadoran
people. 1 Today El Salvador, part of Central America’s Triangle of
Death, is engulfed in gang warfare and drug trafficking. 2 This has
created massive political instability, prevented economic growth, and
has resulted in high homicide rates — all of these have in turn
perpetuated an environment of terror and embedded cultural
violence.3 El Salvador is currently known as the murder capital of the
world - primarily due to gang violence and the multifaceted factors
contributing to the violence that continues to plague the country
today, the effects of which have been tragic on the Salvadoran
society.4
The United States (US) government has maintained interest in El
Salvador and has been a large supporter of the regime since the
country’s civil war in the 1980s. Today, the US maintains political and
security interests in El Salvador, and in an attempt to stabilize the
region, it is one of the largest aid donors.5 Despite the efforts of the
US government to bring prosperity to El Salvador, critics have
Joaquin Chávez. “An anatomy of violence in El Salvador.” NACLA Report on
the Americas, vol. 37, no. 6 (2004), 31.
2
Triangle of Death is a term used to describe the most violent region of the
world, the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala and
Honduras.
3
AFP. “El Salvador becomes world's most deadly country outside a war
zone.” The Telegraph, January 5, 2016.
4
“The World's Most Dangerous Cities.” The Economist (March 31, 2017).
5
Clare Ribando Seelke. “El Salvador: Background and US Relations.” Current
Politics and Economics of South and Central America, vol. 7, no. 4 (2014), 537.
1
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theorized that US involvement in the country created the gang
problem in the first place and contributed to the regime’s aggressive
policies. This paper will begin with an overview of gangs in El
Salvador and an overview of the current historiography on El
Salvador’s history. In order to understand the situation and US
involvement in this process, the analysis will be divided into the
following subtitles: 1980s civil war and the repercussions of US
involvement, El Salvadoran’s migration to the US and reverse
migration (with a focus on Los Angeles and San Salvador), and US
exportation of heavy-handed policies to El Salvador’s
institutionalized use of political violence.
Overview
In Central America, gangs are referred to as “mara” and “pandilla,”
both slang words that are used interchangeably for “youth gang.”
While some studies use the words interchangeably, others
differentiate between the two by defining pandillas as localized groups
that have formally existed in the region and maras as a more
contemporary occurrence that have transnational roots. 6 However,
the term is strongly associated with the Mara Salvatrucha and
Dieciocho gangs, which are commonly referred to as adult “street
gangs” that had evolved from these “youth gangs.” Within El
Salvador, the most prominent gangs are the Mara Salvatrucha, also
known as MS-13, and Mara 18/Barro18/M-18, also known as
Eighteenth Street Gang. Today these are locally known as maras,
developed from youth street gangs to transnational groups. 7
According to collected sources, both gangs compromise more than
87% of the gang membership in El Salvador and have a large
presence in many neighbourhoods.8

Seelke, “Gangs in Central America,” 74.
José Miguel Cruz, “Central American Maras: from youth street gangs to
transnational protection rackets,” Global Crime, vol. 11, no. 4 (2010), 380
8
José Miguel Cruz, “Global Gangs in El Salvador: Maras and the Politics of
Violence,” In Global Gangs Workshop, Centre on Conflict, Development, and
Peacebuilding, Geneva. (2009), 1.
6
7

Roumie 27
These gangs are not a new phenomenon in El Salvador; the origins of
Salvadoran youth gangs can be traced back to the 1950s, among
privileged teenage schoolboys who would partake in rivalries and
erratic street fights.9 Additionally, as a result of the urbanization and
industrialization that El Salvador began experiencing in the 1950s,
evidence suggests that gangs grew in urban centers in the 1960s,
especially with the weakening of public institutions, increased
political turbulence, and the growing elite of coffee plantation owners
that neglected the agrarian poor. 10 According to De Castro, gangs
did not have political aims, and they exhibited little interest in altering
the state structure, which is in contrast to the young guerrillas of the
1960s-1980s who aspired for political power. Instead, the gangs’
objectives were short-term in the form of winning esteem and respect
through committing violence against persons and private property,
consuming soft drugs, and defending their ‘turf’ from other gangs.
Despite the criminal nature of their actions, some of these groups
had close relationships with their communities and acted as
neighborhood overseers. 11 Today the gangs have developed from
being turf-based small gangs who hung out in slums and city squares,
to an association of cliques or networks who identify under the same
franchise of either MS-13 or 18th Street, controlling many areas in El
Salvador and organizing larger criminal activities. Nevertheless,
whether young people in El Salvador are involved with gangs or not,
they tend to face high levels of violence. According to the El
Salvadoran Forensic Institute, 41% of murders in 2006 were
perpetrated against young people aged 10 to 24 years old.12 This has
largely become a cultural issue and violence has permeated many
aspects of life.

Manuel Vasquez, “Saving souls transnationally: Pentecostalism and gangs in
El Salvador and the United States,” Christianity, Social Change, and
Globalization in the America’s (2003), 7.
10
Cruz, “Global Gangs in El Salvador: Maras and the Politics of Violence," 2.
11
Rafael Fernández De Castro, "Demystifying the maras." Americas Quarterly,
vol. 1, no. 2 (2007), 70-71.
12
Cruz, “Global Gangs in El Salvador: Maras and the Politics of Violence,” 713.
9
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There is no unanimous consensus amongst experts on the exact
causes and logic of gang proliferation. The academic debate is split
regarding whether gangs in Central America are locally rooted or if
they have proliferated due to migration and transnational crime.
Some scholars, like Anika Oettler and Nazih Richani argue that gangs
in Central America have taken over the role of the state and that they
provide order to weak institutional societies. 13 This is especially
prevalent in poor neighbourhoods in which gangs can attract
members easily due to their cohesiveness, strong collective identity,
and offering the chance for economic improvement, albeit through
illegal means. In this sense, there is a focus on the root causes of gang
proliferation, such as unemployment, incarceration, relocation, and
communal fragmentation. 14 Scholars have also concentrated on the
evolution of gangs over time. Some scholars stress the role of local
conditions that lead to “gang institutionalization,” while other
scholars focus on the contribution of communication technologies
and the role of globalization. 15 A prominent scholar on gangs in
Central America, Miguel Cruz, focuses on “gang institutionalization”
by highlighting the contact that occurs between local conditions and
transnational progressions (migration, diffused cultural practices).
Cruz asserts that marginalisation and law enforcement policies are
important in understanding the emergence of street gangs in the
United States and Central America, especially in explaining the
transnational networks and influential local protection rackets.
However, in his argument, the circular migration of Salvadorans to
the US is not sufficient enough to explain the growing
transnationalism of gangs, as other Latin American states had mass
migration but have different results than El Salvador. This means that
El Salvador is a unique case due to the divergent results and the
current severity of its gang situation. Hence, Cruz focuses on a
Nazih Richani, “State capacity in postconflict settings: Explaining criminal
violence in El Salvador and Guatemala.” Civil Wars, vol. 12, no. 4 (2010), 431455.
14
Anika Oettler, “The Central American fear of youth.” International Journal of
Conflict and Violence, vol 5, no. 2 (2011), 263.
15
Cruz, “Central American maras: from youth street gangs to transnational
protection rackets,” 380-388.
13
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spectrum of factors: marginalization, migration, cross-culturalization,
and the politics of violence. 16
Although many studies mention the migration of Salvadorans as one
of the interrelated and possible causes of gang proliferation, little
thought is given to US policies that uprooted this gang proliferation.
Additionally, little focus is paid to the history of US involvement in
El Salvador dating back to the 1980-1992 civil war or current foreign
policies that have played a role in the creation of a culture of
violence. Hence, this paper will link much of the research that has
been done on gangs by connecting the US role in the proliferation
and perseverance of gangs in El Salvador. In order to gather a strong
understanding of how the following research relates to each other, a
definition of transnationalism, multiple marginality, and legal violence
is needed. Ian Tyrell defines transnationalism as “the movement of
peoples, ideas, technologies, and institutions across national
boundaries’. 17 It is important to differentiate between
transnationalism from above and transnationalism from below, the
relationship between nations and beyond nations. According to
James Diego Vigil, multiple marginality “outlines several important
components in the relationship between race/ethnicity and gang
membership, including macrohistorical and macrostructural forces,
ecological and economic stressors, elements of social control, and
street socialization.” 18 Furthermore, legal violence is a sort of
structural violence that is embedded and sanctioned within laws, that
intend to protect rights or regulate behavior for the general good, yet
concurrently increases practices that hurt certain social groups.19

Cruz, “Global Gangs in El Salvador: Maras and the Politics of Violence,” 1-9.
Ian Tyrell, “Ian Tyrell Responds.” The American Historical Review, vol. 96,
no. 4 (1991), 1068, 69, 70, 71, 72.
18
Adrienne Freng and Esbensen Finn Aage, “Race and gang affiliation: An
examination of multiple marginality,” Justice Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 4 (2007),
604, 605.
19
Cecilia Menjívar and Leisy Abrego, “Legal Violence: Immigration Law and
the Lives of Central American Immigrants1,” American Journal of Sociology,
vol. 117, no. 5 (2012), 1387.
16
17
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Civil War
It is important to understand the historical and cultural violence in El
Salvador. The civil war acted as a watershed moment in El Salvador’s
history and helped establish a culture of violence as a viable solution
for social and political conflicts. Economic disparities sparked a civil
war that lasted from 1979 until 1992. The US played an active role in
supporting the Salvadoran government during the civil war in its fight
against pro-communist insurgents, which were viewed by the US
government as part of a larger communist network. The US provided
an enormous amount of financial support (sending $1.5 million per
day) and armed and trained government Armed Forces. For example,
the US established the Army School of the Americas, where
Salvadoran military officials were trained in anti-communist counterinsurgency efforts. 20 US support developed into an amplified
repression against communist guerrillas, its sympathizers and
thousands of innocent civilians. The US continued to fund the
regime with military resources despite evidence that military aid was
bypassing the government and ended up in the hands of corrupt
members of the armed forces and paramilitary groups who had
committed terror tactics, such as death squad operations, to pillage
the countryside and massacre whole villages.21 This 12-year conflict
resulted in 70,000 deaths, 500,000 refugees and tens of thousands of
citizens disappeared and wounded. 22 In the post-war era, the U.S.
endorsed a neoliberal economic reconstruction plan in El Salvador,
which resulted in increased foreign investment, privatization of
public infrastructure and lack of investment in public programs.23

Mary Kathleen Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa? Deportation and the
Making of Home in the US-El Salvador Transnatio” PhD. Dissertation. (2014):
103.
21
Stephen Macekura, “For Fear of Persecution: Displaced Salvadorans and US
Refugee Policy in the 1980s.” Journal of Policy History, vol. 23, no. 3 (2011),
300-363.
22
Chávez, “An anatomy of violence in El Salvador,” 33.
23
Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?”, 49.
20
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Issues that led to the war were largely ignored, while wounds and
frustration would remain further exacerbated by the neoliberal
policies that would push many into poverty. Neoliberal policies failed
to work; they ignored the fundamental aspects of peace building by
pushing aside national reconciliation and creating little opportunity
for poverty alleviation. The war destroyed the social makeup, while
also implementing characteristics of violence in everyday life, the use
of terror and aggression to deal with social conflict and the lack of
value for human wellbeing. In this context, youth gangs reproduced
their social frustrations through violence that was internalized during
the war. 24 According to Miguel Cruz, many Salvadorans faced
socioeconomic discrimination that induced further forms of
marginalization.25
Another fundamental factor in the increased use of violence is the
proliferation of firearms and explosives in civilian hands that were
left behind by the war. According to Joaquin Chavez, this is an
emergence of a “culture of arms” in which dominant cultural
attitudes favour the ownership and the usage of firearms. Incidences
of violent crimes involving firearms are very high due to the
increased use of both registered and illegal weapons; the number of
deaths related to gun use today is greater than in the post-war period.
26
This is part of the accessibility thesis that argues that the extensive
accessibility of arms and light weapons point to an amplified use of
violence.27
For Chavez, then, the US is in large part to blame for this, as many
American weapons entered the market during the civil war and today
continue to be used in criminal activities.28 According to a Periodic
Brief prepared for the Small Arms Survey in El Salvador, the large
Vasquez,” “Saving souls transnationally” 4.
Cruz, “Global Gangs in El Salvador: Maras and the Politics of Violence,” 7-8.
26
Chávez, “An anatomy of violence in El Salvador,” 37-38.
27
Jayantha Dhanapala, “Multilateral cooperation on small arms and light
weapons: From crisis to collective response,” Brown Journal of World Affairs,
vol. 9 (2002), 164-165.
28
Chávez, “An anatomy of violence in El Salvador,” 37.
24
25
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transfers of small arms and light weapons that the US government
made to the Salvadoran military during the civil war are now
commonly used and reported in criminal activities.29 According to the
study, the older supply of weapons presents enough substantial harm
even without taking into consideration the entry of post-civil war
legal and illegal weaponry. 30 With increasing instances of armed
violence and a post-war state marked by a corrupt police force and an
unreliable judicial system, many people buy weapons for the purpose
of protection. The war left a divided and traumatized society with
many internally displaced, increasing disintegration of major cities,
and an environment that allowed gangs to thrive in the face of
economic marginalization, social exclusion, and violence.31 Therefore,
it is not surprising that gangs increased after the civil war, the
conditions and aftermath of which would set in stone a culture of
violence; a traumatized society, an increased level of poverty and use
of violence in all areas of life, as well as ready access to weapons.
Migration:

Reception

On the onset of the civil war, following massive migration and
displacement, many El Salvadorans would attempt to a seek refugee
in the United States. At this time, the 1980 Refugee Act removed
nationality as a criterion for refugee status and replaced it with a caseby-case basis in which refugees would be judged individually instead
of as a group.32 Refugee policy was extremely politicized because it
became easier to ignore large groups fleeing war or persecution, and
because the US supported the right-wing government of El Salvador,
it systematically rejected refugee standing, refugee exemption, and
political asylum to Salvadorans escaping the war. This dictated the
refugee policy towards Salvadorans at the time, and refugee status
William Godnick, Erick Haven, and Ivonne Martinez-Henriquez. “SAND
(Program on Security and Development) Brief: El Salvador.” Periodic Brief
prepared for the Small Arms Survey (March 2000), 1-3.
30
Godnick, Haven, and Martinez-Henriquez. “SAND,” 3.
31
Cruz, “Global Gangs in El Salvador: Maras and the Politics of Violence,” 6.
32
Macekura, “For Fear of Persecution,” 359.
29
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was rejected with the vague and biased interpretation of “fear of
persecution” clause. Thousands of displaced Salvadorans were
increasingly detained and deported at the border and despite their
well-founded fears, labeled as economic refugees. 33 Between 1983
and 1990, the US approved asylum for only 2.6% of the applications
submitted by Salvadorans.34 The legal consequences of the Refugee
Act put forward an exclusionary refugee policy; the Cold War
mentality was clearly evident in granting and favoring refugee status
to citizens fleeing communist regimes. More than 90% of the 3
million refugees granted admittance into the US between the years
1946 and 1994 had fled communist regimes (for example, from
Poland, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Romania and etc). 35 Within this
environment, it is evident at that time that the US functioned in a
political climate that was unfriendly and unreceptive to Salvadorans,
as there existed strong anti-immigration and anti-refugee rhetoric as a
whole. 36 Within the media and politics there existed a strong
perception of Salvadoran refugees as self-interested economic
migrants, and prevalent xenophobia rhetoric questioned their cultural
integration. 37 As Salvadorans were in search of a haven, many were
rendered to a precarious legal position throughout the entire decade
and would face many issues forging their new lives in the United
States.

Life and uncertainty

For Salvadorans, life in the US was marked by symbolic and
structural violence that produced social suffering and long-term
repercussions for incorporation into society. These struggles resulted
from the fear of deportation; the exploitation of their work and
rights; as well as their exclusion from socioeconomic resources that
were vital for their mobility and incorporation into society.
Immigrants are accountable to the law but are also excluded from
Macekura, “For Fear of Persecution,” 357- 76.
Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 107-08.
35
John Povwell, Encyclopedia of North American Immigration, New York, NY:
Facts on File, Inc., (2005), 64.
36
Povwell, Encyclopedia of North American Immigration, 109.
37
Macekura, “For Fear of Persecution,” 364-67.
33
34
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legal protection that virtually forces them to reside in a nation, but
not be seen as part of it. From the initial migration of Salvadorans
into the US in the early 1980s, they have been in a limbo of legal
uncertainty with temporary applications, reapplications, long
processes, and a threat of looming deportation. 38 Unfortunately, they
also lacked a direct path to citizenship due to strict requirements and
complex procedures that both excluded and discouraged many from
becoming citizens. The repercussions of this in the long-term are
shown on statistics on Salvadorans living in the US in 2011, in which
only 29% were citizens, 46% were undocumented, another 25% held
temporary status or green cards, and a significant 71% were eligible
for removal if detained by immigration officials for either a lack of
documentation or committed offense.39
The Salvadoran migrant community was left in a legally vulnerable
and highly deportable state. Part of this is since many were ineligible
for legal protection and social services because of their status, and
undocumented Salvadorans were forced into vulnerable and limited
spaces with little upward mobility that made them easily exploitable
sources of labor. The majority that resided in the US after the civil
war were rural and uneducated, which has further put them in lowincome jobs with a narrow prospect for upward mobility. 40 The
Salvadoran populations in general are more likely to live in poverty
than both native-born population and foreign-born populations.41 A
study conducted in 1995 showed that many worked in low-paying
jobs, little security and mobility as well as a feeling of alienated from
mainstream society. 42 Many Salvadoran immigrants lived in fear of
being deported, while media and public discourse portrayed them as
undeserving lawbreakers, which further alienated their contributions
in society and created a situation ripe for their mistreatment. 43 In
Menjívar and Abrego, “Legal Violence,” 1384-1392.
Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 111.
40
Sarah Gammage, “El Salvador: Despite End to Civil War, Emigration
Continues,” Migration Policy Institute (July 26, 2007), 1-3.
41
Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 111-12.
42
Vasquez, “Saving souls transnationally,” 5-6.
43
Menjívar and Abrego, “Legal Violence,” 1411.
38
39
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1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act (IIRIRA) and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) came into effect. Both of these acts permitted and made
easier the deportation of documented immigrants by expanding the
term-aggravated felony to incorporate offenses that were previously
seen as relatively minor crimes, as well as mandating the ground for
removal if convicted of a prison sentence of one year or more. 44 For
example, in 1998 Salvadorans accounted for approximately 21% of
immigrants who were deported, and today they compromise the
fourth largest group of deportees. 45 Laws such as these normalized
the perception of Salvadorans as criminals, which impeded
integration and hindered mobility in several ways.
The Creation of Gangs in Los Angeles
The largest population of Salvadorans in the US reside in California,
particularly in Los Angeles (LA). Within LA, ethnic and racial
tensions, as well as a negative reception, along with the psychological
impact of war, fostered the reaction and formation of a Salvadoran
street gang. South Central Los Angeles was an area previously
dominated by African Americans, and with the mass migration of
Latinos (especially Mexicans), identity politics would emerge between
both groups as they viewed each other as threats and competed for
status and space in society. It is within this context that Salvadorans
arrived in Los Angeles, and due to their already existing state of
vulnerability, many youths would be enticed into street gangs to give
themselves purpose and identity.46 In LA, Maras originated from the
18th Street (M-18) or Dieciocho gang in Los Angeles (Chicano),
which was founded by Mexican immigrants early in the 1960s and
grew with the membership of many Salvadoran and Central
American refugees.47 Salvadorans felt the need to carve out their own
space and self-defense groups in the streets in relation to Chicano
gangs. Later in the 1980s, Salvadoran refugees would form their rival
group, which would be identified as the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13).
Menjívar and Abrego, “Legal Violence,” 1391.
Menjívar and Abrego, “Legal Violence,” 1391.
46
Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 114.
47
Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 110-114.
44
45
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The Dieciocho and the Salvatrucha developed into hostile rivals and
often clashed with each other and with law enforcement in the city
blocks of Los Angeles. 48 It is within these gangs that Salvadorans
would incorporate new norms, values, and attitudes in exchange for
defense, relationships, and support. Salvadoran youth would borrow
from the dominant Chicano culture and create their own faction; they
adopted the lifestyle, language, and the dress of cholos (gang
members). A hybrid culture emerged, and it is evident through the
Mara language, which is a combination of Salvadoran Spanish,
Chicano Spanish, and African-American English.49
When MS-13 and M-18 were first formed, they participated primarily
in drug deals, trafficking, and turf-based fighting. The Los Angeles
Police Department (LAPD) met these problems with a repressive
force by prohibiting suspected gangs from meeting in certain areas,
and raiding suspected gang hangouts and homes. During this period,
the LAPD-Rampart Division’s anti-gang unit Community Resources
Against Street Hoodlums (CRASH) operated in mostly Salvadoran
areas of Los Angeles. 50 Despite their primary focus on gangs in
general, they were especially fixated on targeting, criminalizing, and
deporting Latino immigrants and young adults that they linked with
urban decay. 51 This trend of targeting and criminalization would
continue with the creation in 2005 of ICE’s Operation Community
Shield, which is a partnership between the government and law
enforcement that identify and target street gangs for deportation. 52
Since then, more than 31,200 gang members and associates have
been arrested and deported through the program.53 A major concern
is the fact that there is no legal definition of what constitutes a gang
membership; therefore, law enforcement officials have complete
Dennis Rodgers and Adam Baird, “Understanding gangs in contemporary
Latin America,” Forthcoming in Scott H. Decker and David C. Pyrooz (eds.),
Handbook of Gangs and Gang Responses, New York: Wiley (2015), 14.
49
Vasquez, “Saving souls transnationally,” 8.
50
Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 114-115.
51
Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 115.
52
Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 100-116.
53
Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 100-116.
48
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discretion and judgment which leads to many innocent individuals
caught up in gang raids also being convicted and deported. 54 The
media has played a strong role in the sensationalization of the gang
phenomenon, and it has also contributed to stereotypes and the
perception that Salvadoran migrants are criminals who will inflict
disorder in the U.S. 55 The consequence of all of this is increased
deportation and marginalization of the larger Salvadoran community.
Reverse Migration:

Context of Return

Once the civil war ended in El Salvador 1991, thousands of
Salvadorans made their way back home, both voluntarily and
forcefully through deportation. The bulk of deportations would take
place after the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigration Responsibility Act. In the first year alone, 1,200
Salvadorans with criminal backgrounds would be deported, more
than half of which had ties to gangs. 56 Removals have increased
since the mid-2000s, with a significant percentage holding a criminal
record, but not necessarily gang related. For example, out of the
18,677 Salvadorans deported in 2012, 46.2% had a criminal record.57
During this period, the US government did not provide a complete
criminal history on deportees to the Salvadoran government; hence in
many cases, Salvadorans with criminal records were invisible to local
authorities. 58 However, the Sombra Negra (Black Shadow), a guarded
group made up of officers and military personnel who during the war
were known for their death squad tactics, would hunt down and
murder suspected gang members at times directly on airport arrival.59
Most of the returnees were young males who grew up in a different
culture, had left El Salvador as children during the war and hence had
Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 100-116.
Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 115-116.
56
Cruz, “Global Gangs in El Salvador: Maras and the Politics of Violence,” 2.
57
Seelke, “El Salvador: Background and US Relations,” 563.
58
Seelke, “Gangs in Central America,” 89.
59
Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 121.
54
55
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no connection to their birth land. In some cases, they did not even
speak Spanish and their families remained in the US; therefore, they
had weak social ties. 60 The type of services available to deportees
from either the US or Salvadoran government were few; hence they
encountered a weak institutional framework for reinsertion into
society. There was once a program called Bienvenidos a Casa, or
Welcome Home, which provided limited help, but its main function
was to record incoming deportees for potential surveillance. 61
Reintegration proved difficult, returnees often become financial
burdens on their families and were seen as alien in their homeland.
Additionally, within Salvadoran society, there is a prevalent conflation
of deportee and gangster identities, which has led to the classification
of entire groups of deportees as possible threats to national security.62
Salvadorans returned to a country that is still dealing with the
structural problems that lead to the civil war (inequality, poverty,
marginalization, etc.). Consequently, many struggled with a weak
support system, a lack of economic opportunities, and increased
levels of violence and criminalization, all of which would further
marginalize them in society.63
Within the group of deportees that had spent the majority of their
lives in the US, some see deportation as “betrayal, exile, and
banishment from the homes they constructed in the U.S.” 64 This
group is further marginalized because they are also automatically
treated as if they are gang members even when they do not have a
history of gang membership.65 Whether they had a gang history or
not, many of the returning Salvadorans faced stigmatization, violence,
and a hostile context of return. 66 Therefore, having arrived in a
country they barely knew, deportees started to create the networks
and behavioural patterns that offered them security and support in
Vasquez, “Saving souls transnationally,” 11.
Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 123.
62
Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 50.
63
Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 118.
64
Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 198.
65
Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 198.
66
Rodgers and Baird, “Understanding gangs in contemporary Latin America,” 4.
60
61
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the US (focus on LA), and this is where the formation of chapters of
the Dieciocho and Salvatrucha gangs takes place.

Cultural diffusion and Gangs

When deportees with gang histories and criminal records from
California took to the streets, they encountered gangsters who
venerated their style and mannerisms, as well as respected their
experience with real gang culture in the United States. This would
present many with an opportunity to influence and direct gangs in El
Salvador. 67 Existing gangs in El Salvador started to adopt the ways of
returning gang members, and a process known as social remittance,
which is the movement of symbolism, identities, and norms that
accompanied the migration of deportees. 68 This started the process
and expansion of maras that would occur through social imitation
based on migration and networking. In this way, deportees’ influence
would change and assimilate the gang culture dramatically. They
diffused cultural styles in the form of “the use of tattoos, the
utilization of gang signs to communicate and, more importantly for
the increase of violence and criminal behavior, they included the
norms, values, and knowledge about how to behave, about who is the
enemy, and about who is friend.” 69 Prior to this, youth gangs
compromised numerous small territorial groups; however, with
increased migration of California deportees, small groups would
become two large groups of cliques, the MS-13 and the M-18. A
study piloted in San Salvador in 1996 revealed that 84% of gangs
were linked to either MS-13 or M-18. Although American deportees
made up 10% of gang membership, the cross-culturalization would
occur largely through contact, imitation, and adaption of identities,
which is what would transform these gangs into transnational forces
between the US and Central America. 70 This was not an organized
effort, the old turf gangs transformed into cliques that would
compromise an association of gangs recognized as either MS-13 or
Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 121.
Cruz, “Central American maras: from youth street gangs to transnational
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M-18. These so-called cliques each controlled a specific
neighbourhood with relative independence from each other;
however, that would change with gang warfare.71
Violence and battles among gangs, specifically MS-13 and M-18,
would re-construct the struggle for urban spaces and territory. Gangs
would use tattoos to mark their bodies and identity, showing
allegiance to their gang. With the dominant two gangs, there was also
an increase in the likelihood of interaction among the warring gangs
proliferated beyond territorial areas. This created a changing dynamic
of violence because it could now take place anywhere, no longer
defined by specific boundaries, as they went even beyond a gang’s
turf. In this sense, a gang’s turf became diffused, and it would cover
the entire space in which gangs moved, which would cause the
conflict and insecurity to citizens to become more pervasive.
Identities associated with either gang would be more important than
controlling a specific neighbourhood or turf, and this would reshape
gang warfare. According to Cruz, gangs would no longer build their
identity based on ethnic origin like they did in California, or build
their identity in relation to a specific turf like they did in the earlier
days in El Salvador (Central America); instead they would construct
their identity based on the opposition and contention with the rival
gang. 72 In this sense, identity became more important than space,
and violence would function to reinforce these identities. This would
have brutal effects because it is no longer entrenched in a native
context of pandilla culture; therefore, it is less rule-bound and
constrained.
US Zero tolerance policing:

Mano Dura (the “iron-fist” plan)

As a result of the growing presence of MS-13 and M-18, the El
Salvadoran government implemented anti-gang policing strategies
Cruz, “Central American maras: from youth street gangs to transnational
protection rackets.” 386.
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known as Mano Dura (2003) and Super Mano Dura (2004). Both of
these plans centered on raids and targeting and imprisoning of gang
members for showing gang-related tattoos or gang signs.73 Any signs
of gang allegiance and criminal activities would be punished with
prison sentences up to five to twelve years. In this effort, increased
spending on policing and a creation of a joint anti-gang military
police patrols were endorsed. 74 These efforts would largely
criminalize youth street groups as well as limit the civil rights of gang
members; the intended goals were a large-scale persecution and
suppression of gangs. According to the Salvadoran police from July
2003 to 2005, the police arrested 30,934 youths alleged to be gang
members. 75 According to Cruz, it is essential to pay attention to the
“politics of violence” which has institutionalized gangs through a
combination of efforts of institutions, players, and plans that
advanced the severe use of violence as a standard feature of
Salvadoran youth gangs. 76 The consequences of such strict policies
would be the primary tool to dealing with marginalized youth and
would further institutionalize gangs.
The mass incarceration of gang members overpopulated the already
weak prison system, but it also provided the opportunity for gang
organization and cohesion. This was made possible by the decision of
the state, built on the American model, to separate gangs in prison
centers based on their gang affiliation.77 This would allow gangs to
network inside jails with cliques from all over the country leading to
an ultimately better organized and well-connected network of gangs.
The Jails themselves would become an assembly in which gangs
would debate, make deals, and resolve strategies and plans. Mano
dura law only worsened gang violence. It entrenched the state’s use
of violence against the youth and offered the maras with the opening
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to consolidate, unite, and acquire regional and national leaderships. 78
Also, the all-war against gangs brought in new violent actors (drugs
and traffickers), more resources (guns and weapons for defense), and
an entrenched pattern of Salvadoran violence. These hardline policies
would mark a turning point for the institutionalization of gangs, and
the use of violent policies to suppress them would lead to further
violence and transcend boundaries of both the state and the
community.
When looking at what drives violence and crime, inequality and social
exclusion play a major role in creating a breeding ground for gang
membership. Consequently, the hardline policies that are being used
to combat gangs are further adding on to the diminishing social
relations. On the contrary, Nicaragua, a country in Central America
that is the poorest (GDP) yet the safest is using a different approach
to deal with gangs. It has been fortunate and spared much of the
gang violence that nearby countries face and its approach to violence
is key to this. Instead of pooling money and resources into a police
budget, Nicaragua uses their resources for community development
and has enforced a softer approach on gangs to prevent further
marginalization and crime. A community-based approach is used in
regards to gangs; in which police sponsor meetings with social
workers, community members and family meetings with competing
gangs and groups. This approach is used as a tactic of inclusion
instead of isolating and repressing local gangs, both current and
potential gangs are given the opportunity to resolve differences and
are provided the resources and assistance to change their course of
life away from that of criminal activities and gangs. For example,
when Daniel Ortega resumed presidency in 2007, he put forward and
adopted community-based policing programs - which are a stark
difference to the mano dura policies used in El Salvador. 79 It is
important to note the significant influence the US plays in this
creation of a penal state - an extension of US efforts at dealing with
Cruz, “Global Gangs in El Salvador: Maras and the Politics of Violence,” 15.
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crime both abroad and at home (further elaborated on in the next
section).

US export of zero-tolerance policies

“We’re mounting a coordinated, aggressive suppression strategy that
targets the worst offenders and the most violent gangs. We’re
converging local, state, federal and even international efforts …
coming at them with everything we have.” – Los Angeles Mayor
Antonio Villaraigosa,80
According to Markus-Michael Müller, the import of anti-gang zero
tolerance-oriented penal policing is to a large degree prompted by
police building efforts sponsored by US organizations as well as
through interrelated activities of American embassies. 81 Other
methods included police training by the FBI and Drug Enforcement
Agency, as well as connections of Central American law enforcement
agents to US law enforcement divisions that actively pursued zerotolerance methods of policing (Los Angeles). US police building
assistance has converged with local political interests of holding
crime accountable. This would connect international punitive antigang efforts across the Americas, which would result in crackdowns
in marginalized neighbourhoods and lead to the unprecedented
imprisonment of marginalized youth in El Salvador. 82 Since the early
2000s, there is a growing perception of MS-13 and M-18 as
transnational gangs, which has brought Central American and
American officials under the guise of viewing these gangs as both
national and regional security threats connected to cross-border
criminal activities and drug trafficking. The United States would have
an interest in maintaining its national security against gangs, drugs,
and even terrorist links. 83 In the last decade, the US has increased
collaborative efforts with El Salvador, communicative links on report
“LAPD targets city's worst gangs.” Los Angeles Times, February 9, 2007.
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and intelligence records, funding the International Law Enforcement
Academy in El Salvador, blocking assets of gang members, and
attempting to create a transnational security apparatus.84
In addition, these efforts abroad are entwined with efforts at home as
they fortify punitive gang suppression exertions within the US.
American efforts in gaining as much information and data on gang
members abroad have produced a systematic criminalization of
marginalized Latino and Salvadoran groups in the US.85 Not only is
the US pursuing a war on transnational gangs abroad; it has translated
into a war on gangs at home. As mentioned in the section on the
context of migration, migrant Latin American communities in Los
Angeles are faced with increased racialized and politicized policing
and surveillance in their neighbourhoods. Policy concerns about
transnational gangs have translated into increased pressures to
persecute gang members at home. 86 Not only has the US exported its
version of heavy-handed policies in dealing with gangs and other
criminals in an effort to coordinate a security apparatus, but such
efforts also have an effect on communities abroad and at home,
which creates a cycle of violence and marginalization.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper has examined the multilayered and
interlinked factors of the US influence and actions that instigated the
circumstances in which gangs proliferated in El Salvador.
Furthermore, it is evident that through these actions, the US has also
created a foundation for a culture of violence. Starting at the
watershed moment of the Salvadoran civil war, US efforts would
prove to be vital to the government crackdown on guerillas.
Although the US backed government won the war against
communism, it started a new war against poverty, marginalization,
the use of violence and the culture of arms. The civil war would set in
Müller, “Punitive Entanglements,” 716.
Müller, “Punitive Entanglements,” 711-716.
86
Müller, “Punitive Entanglements,” 716-718.
84
85

Roumie 45
stone the culture of violence - use of violence to solve political and
social issues. In addition, the mass migration and reception of
Salvadorans in the US can be described as a negative social reception
that forced structural violence (legal violence) that would place
migrants at the marginal of society leading many to seek other outlets
to fulfill the void created by a lack of belonging. The growth of MS13 and M-18 in Los Angeles is largely due to marginalization, ethnic
conflict and marking space in society. Law enforcement’s harsh
response and use of legal violence in the form of criminalization and
deportation would set the stage for transnationalism. The massive
influx of deportees with criminal records back to El Salvador, to a
society still dealing with the effects of the civil war and a government
lacking the institution to govern properly would lead to the
reconfiguration of the existing gang culture. The diffusion of the Los
Angeles gang cultural style into Salvadoran gangs and the ultimate
dominance of both MS-13 and M-18 would be transformative for
gangs in El Salvador. The rise and dominance of both gangs would
transform space, guerilla warfare, and criminal activities. The staunch
government response of Mano Dura and Super Mano Dura would
benefit the institutionalization of gangs while marginalizing youth and
further creating instability and conflict within society. It is evident
that such anti-gang zero tolerance punitive policies are imported
through contact, support, cooperative efforts and links with US
agencies, governments, and law enforcement. The transnational
context of gangs and their ability to transcend borders, as is evident
in this case, and US efforts to combat gangs both abroad and at
home, have resulted in repercussions on Salvadoran communities and
set a cycle of political violence and marginalization.
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